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Ending
Homelessness
among Mentally
Disabled People

Steven A. Hitov

some of the many shortcomings of the mental health system oper(DMH) and explores the impact
of that system on single homeless individuals who suffer from some form of serious or
This article examines

ated by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
long-term mental
briefly

large

disability.

To afford that discussion context, however, the

examines those forces which have, and have

article first

not, significantly contributed to the

number of mentally disabled homeless persons. It suggests certain changes, includcommunity services and the creation

ing a shift in departmental focus from hospitals to

of a housing subsidy system exclusively for
its

current practice of at best ignoring,

DMH

clients,

which would allow

and at worst actually

DMH to end

causing, the homelessness of

mentally disabled people.

The Deinstitutionalization Mythology

When discussing the disproportionate
are currently homeless,

one

is

1

presence of mental

illness

among individuals who

often encouraged to address the relation between that

phenomenon and the process of state mental hospital deinstitutionalization that has
been under way for approximately thirty years. This is not a useful undertaking for several reasons. First, it assumes that there is somehow a significant causal relationship
between the two. At least for Massachusetts, this is demonstrably incorrect. A study of
homeless adults done for the state Department of Mental Health

(DMH) determined

was thirty-eight years old, and that just about half the
population was under age thirty-five. 2 While
has reduced its inpatient population
from 20,000 in 1960 to just over 2,000 today, over half of that decrease was accomplished by 1970. Further, the people discharged during that period had typically been
that the "average" such person

DMH

3

institutionalized for years at a time. Thus, they could not, as a group, represent the cur-

rently

homeless unless

DMH hospitalized and discharged them when they were verita-

ble children. Otherwise they would

the

now simply be too old to yield the profile revealed by

DMH study. Whatever their fate, those who were discharged and neglected twenty-

five years

ago do not constitute a

Steven A. Hitov

is

significant percentage of today's homeless.

a staff attorney in the Homelessness Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services and the
Harvard Homelessness Law Clinic.

supervising attorney of the
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A second shortcoming of focusing on deinstitutionalization
among those who

is its

suggestion that

from a mental disability is somehow a medical
rather than a social problem, one that has presumably resulted from prematurely discontinued treatment. At best this entices one and, as we shall see, has led
to
focus on varying forms of "treatment," rather than housing, as a potential solution. At
worst, it suggests that reinstitutionalization may be a viable response to homelessness.
The data on this topic simply do not support such a conclusion. In separate studies
conducted in Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio, researchers determined that while
approximately 30 percent of the homeless people they interviewed had major mental
health problems and most of them needed some mental health services, only 5 percent
to 7 percent would even benefit from, much less require, inpatient care to meet their
needs. 4 Unless we as a society are willing to forcibly hospitalize vast numbers of people
who do not require such care in order to "capture" the relatively few who might, reinstitutionalization cannot possibly be viewed as a rational response to the problem of
homelessness among those with mental disabilities. This is particularly true when one
considers that the current average cost of maintaining a person in an institution in
Massachusetts ranges between $126,000 and $178,000 per year. 5 Even people who are
so frustrated with the persistence of homelessness that they might otherwise be tempted
by this "out-of-sight-out-of-mind" approach must rethink their position or be willing
to shoulder enormous tax increases in support of their viewpoint.
Unfortunately, the focus on deinstitutionalization is not merely a benign mistake. It
serves both to misdirect one's attention when searching for solutions, and also, intenhomelessness

suffer

DMH

tionally or otherwise, to obfuscate the fact that the current crisis of

direct

and predictable

result of

more than

homelessness

is

the

a decade of government policies aimed at

dismantling the very structures that formerly allowed large numbers of desperately

poor people to maintain a home. While the correlation between the Reagan adminis6
tration's attack on public and subsidized housing and the current rise in homelessness
is now widely recognized as a true social disaster, it is one that predictably had a disproportionate impact on poor people with mental handicaps, who regularly lose out
when competing with others for increasingly scarce housing resources.
Compounding the woes of this already embattled group was the less well-known
attack that Ronald Reagan waged specifically against them. Between 1981 and 1983,
the Social Security Administration arbitrarily terminated the Supplemental Security
Income and Social Security Disability benefits of approximately 50,000 people who
7
suffered from mental disabilities. While subsequent lawsuits were successful in having
benefits restored to two thirds of those who had been terminated, that still left almost
17,000 people with mental disabilities without what was almost certainly their only
source of income. It is the stuff of fantasy to assume that large numbers of these
people did not become homeless as a result of having that income abruptly terminated.
In addition,

had

it is

almost certain that significant numbers of those

their benefits restored

who ultimately

were nonetheless rendered homeless, given that landlords

are neither required nor inclined to forgo collecting rent while tenants are busy dis-

puting the actions of the federal government.
benefits often does

little

Once housing

is lost,

the restoration of

to help an individual regain a place to live, for the front-end

costs of acquiring housing (first month's rent, security deposit, finder's fee,

and moving

expenses) are almost always beyond the ability of a poor person to pay.

Thus, deinstitutionalization in fact has had little to do with the current general epidemic of homelessness among the mentally disabled. When the federal government

600

come as no surprise that the most vulbe disproportionately affected. Given that
the Reagan administration's economic smart bombs were specifically targeted upon
affordable housing and people with mental disabilities, it would indeed be a minor
decides to

wage a war on the poor,

it

nerable

among those

miracle

if

DMH's

Inside-Out Service System

While
it is

the mentally

it is

should

living in poverty will

ill

were not overrepresented among the

incorrect to focus

on

single homeless.

deinstitutionalization as the cause of homelessness,

nonetheless important to recognize that the mental health system operated by

DMH does regularly contribute to homelessness among the mentally
directly

and

indirectly.

As

model" of service delivery

this part

utilized

ill,

both

of the article will demonstrate, the "medical

by

DMH has largely been, when viewed either

economically or as a matter of social policy, a failure for everyone except the professionals

who

staff

it,

and has proved especially

ineffective in addressing the

mental

health needs of the homeless.

The

current system has historically, conceptually, and financially always started

with hospitals, and only then, almost as an afterthought, considered other options for
allowing people with mental health problems to continue or resume functioning as
contributing citizens in their communities.

The

results of such a hospital-centered,

DMH

doctor-driven approach are, as a matter of resource allocation, quite appalling.
is

currently expending 42 percent of

its

resources (over $192 million) on inpatient

which serves only 6 percent of its clients. 8 As of May 1991, more than 500 of
9
had not located or devel2,156 inpatients were being detained solely because
oped sufficient community placements for them. 10 So, in addition to spending enormous amounts of money on a tiny fraction of its clients,
is expending almost
25 percent of that sum
more than $45 million
on people who, it admits, do not
require, and almost certainly do not desire, such care.
Unfortunately, the misallocation of resources is not the only, or even necessarily
the most egregious, cost of the
service delivery system. The hospital-centered
medical model views life in the community as a privilege to be earned by those who
have required hospitalization. All
inpatients, regardless of their condition, start
with enforced confinement 11 on a locked ward
sometimes in seclusion
and then
proceed to earn the "privilege" (so described by the
Inpatient Policy Manual)
of increased freedom. Initially a person may be given permission to go to unlocked
parts of the facility, then onto the grounds, and ultimately to visit the community. At
all times, however, even this limited freedom is subject to the person's willingness and
ability to comply with all of a facility's rules, no matter how petty or seemingly unrelated to treatment. Independence, either of thought or action, is not a characteristic
care,

DMH

DMH

—

—

DMH

DMH

—

—

DMH

highly valued, or wisely exhibited, within a

DMH

facility.

The

inpatient system

control oriented that, regardless of treatment needs, facilities have been

is

known

so

to

discharge people directly to the streets or to shelters, even in the dead of winter,
because of perceived violations of "program" rules (such as taking legal, but unprescribed, medications). In short, the inpatient system

is

afforded only rudimentary rights and client choice has
If

one then views community placements,

as

one

little

in

which

clients are

or no meaningful role.

DMH does, as a person's "next step"

following an inpatient experience like that just described,

it is

not surprising that

DMH has chosen to develop "programs," rather than housing, for those seeking to

601

New England Journal of Public Policy

return to the community.

12

Of the approximately 3,255 people now being

served in

DMH residential settings, probably fewer than 100 are residing in DMH's most
touted independent living

Housing Finance Agency

initiative,

(MHFA)

apartments administered by the Massachusetts
which
and the Department of Mental

DMH

to

Retardation have negotiated access. 13 The vast majority of people

who count on

DMH for residence in the community are living not in houses but in programs.
Programs

differ

from housing

in several critical respects,

both

in

human and

financial/development terms. First and foremost, programs reflect the medical

model mentality

that perceives people with mental disabilities as perpetual patients,

with the resultant infantilization that so often accompanies that status. Additionally,
or perhaps merely as an example of that infantilization, programs often require

unrelated adults to share not only their bousing, but even their bedrooms. Nearly

65 percent of the settings for

which only other

DMH

DMH residential services are located in buildings in

clients live.

14

In nearly a third of those settings, people are

forced to share their bedrooms with someone not of their choosing. 15 This

how most

adults choose to

live,

and even

DMH recognizes that

it is

is

not

often clinically

16

Groups of eight unrelated adults simply do not often choose to live
more and
more groups of two are experiencing difficulty in achieving this feat.
Nonetheless, communal living is exactly what DMH demands of most of its clients
in residential programs. The stress of such an environment is compounded by the
fact that a person must conform not only to the norms of general tenancy, but also
to any treatment requirements that DMH decides accompany the program. In this
way, programs perpetuate the control and compliance regimes of the inpatient facilities. Should someone decide that he does not like or no longer needs the type of
dysfunctional.

together. Indeed, the skyrocketing national divorce rate suggests that

treatment that

is

being offered in a given program, he

is

faced not only with the loss

of services but with the specter of imminent homelessness. 17 This

is

hardly an envi-

ronment in which one is likely to question the services being rendered. As a result,
consumer choice and input, and ultimately the quality of any services offered, are
also victims of the current

DMH system.

At the opposite end of the human experience spectrum, but of equal importance,
is the situation in which a person is quite happy with a given program and therefore
flourishes in it. Such a scenario suggests a happy ending, but that is not always the
case. A person who has come to consider a program of a given intensity level to be
home, and thrives there, risks being removed from her home exactly because she is
doing so well. The "better" she does, the greater the chance that she will have to
move to a lower intensity program so that someone else can benefit from the program she found to be so rewarding. While from a medical perspective the person
might be expected to be joyous about her perceived improvement, from a human
perspective she is more likely to be distraught at the prospect of losing perhaps the
first true home she has known. Perversely, this possibility builds in an incentive for a
person not to do too well if she indeed likes her situation. Thus, even an apparently
"successful" program may prove in the long run to be injurious.
Human costs are not the only ones associated with a system that assumes it must
provide residential programs in order to return people to the community. While it

now appears

that, as a result of the

Governor's Special Commission inquiry, Masboth finances and

sachusetts has finally decided to address the abysmal condition
quality of care

18

— of

its

public inpatient psychiatric
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facilities,

—

that undertaking

is

made more

being

difficult

by the method of community service delivery utilized by

DMH. The commission has called for the creation of 700 additional community
placements by the end of June 1993 to accommodate current inpatients 19 who do not
now or will not by then need inpatient care. This initiative is part of an overall plan
to reduce the inpatient capacity of state facilities while, it is hoped, improving, but at
a

minimum not reducing, the quality of care currently being provided to anyone.
The commission has identified two major problems in accomplishing the creation

of the additional community placements. Both, as
exist solely
First,

it

turns out, are problems that

because of the limited approach to community care employed by

because so

many of DMH's

DMH.

present and projected residential settings are pro-

gram oriented and congregate in nature, they require substantial lead time, and money,
and develop the property in which they operate. Consequently, the
ability to respond even to anticipated need is quite limited. The financial and logistical ability to accommodate unanticipated demand is nonexistent. This reality has led
to perceive that it is caught in a chicken-and-egg situation in which it recog-

just to acquire

DMH

nizes that

it

can save money by discontinuing unnecessary inpatient care, but cannot

do so because it lacks the finances and properties necessary to provide more
appropriate and cheaper, but by no means inexpensive, 20 care in the community. Thus,
the entire system is constantly backed up by the difficulty of developing programs of
afford to

21

varying intensity levels necessary to respond to ever-changing client need.

Unfortunately, as the commission report also recognizes, the problems for the

DMH community residential program do not end when the money has been
Because the programs so often create congregations of DMH

typical

found to finance

it.

now familiar NIMBY

(not-in-my-back-yard) syndrome regularly rears its
Neighborhoods and even whole cities all too frequently attempt to
erect barriers to the siting of community residences. While the law is increasingly
clear that such efforts are illegal, defeating them and winning over a neighborhood
is both difficult and time-consuming work. Moreover, it is work that often turns
what should be a very private affair, namely, a person's desired choice of residence,
clients,

the

provincial head.

into a public,

if

not a

political,

debate. This process only exacerbates the already

lengthy delays inherent in developing necessary community resources. 22

The inability of the current community residential system to respond on an "as
needed" basis has a disproportionate negative impact on homeless individuals with
mental disabilities, many of whom are "pink-papered," that is, forcibly admitted pursuant to M.G.L. c. 123, §12, to
inpatient facilities following acute psychiatric
episodes on the street. Such individuals definitionally enter the facilities in need of

DMH

housing as well as acute care, but their inpatient stays are often quite short, varying in
length from overnight to one or two weeks. While, as a matter of law, people admitted

pursuant to Section 12 are entitled to an individual service plan (ISP) designed to
assess

and address both

their medical

and

social needs,

never afforded to such short-term inpatients.
tally

As

23

in practice ISPs are

almost

a consequence, the homeless

men-

disabled receive virtually no assistance even in applying for the public benefit

programs for which they may be eligible before they are again discharged.
Further, because of the chronic shortage of community placements and the inherent difficulty of creating and siting new ones of the type now most often utilized, it
should

come

ments and
of such a

is

list

as

no

surprise that

DMH maintains lengthy waiting

reluctant at best to insert a

more

lists

for such place-

recently admitted inpatient at the top

simply because he happens to have absolutely nowhere to

603

live.

As

a

New England Journal of Public Policy

DMH

homeless individuals who have been pink-papered to
facilities are regby those facilities right back to the street or to a singles shelter,
where they must sleep in crowded, open barracks with numerous other equally poor
and otherwise troubled people and walk the streets from dawn to dusk each day
while the shelters are closed. As one might easily predict, many of those so discharged
quickly wind up back in the facility, often in worse condition than upon their initial
result,

ularly discharged

admission. This practice

so pervasive, and so inherently clinically inappropriate,

is

two years of ultimately fruitless negotiations, two
24
it have been filed against DMH.
The present system constantly undermines independence by demanding and
rewarding compliance, in the guise of teaching personal responsibility, and enforces
that demand by tying it directly to the provision of housing. It is a system that is both
enormously expensive and wasteful, at least partly because it continues to elevate the
perceived need for treatment above the obvious need for food and housing. In short,
it is a system in need of a total overhaul if it is ever to achieve the national goal, set
25
forth in the recently enacted Americans with Disabilities Act, of integrating as many
disabled citizens as possible, as fully as possible, back into the community.
that in the past year, following

separate lawsuits seeking to curtail

Providing Housing with Desired Supports

As

the Governor's Special Commission has determined, the entire

system must be revamped

if it is

DMH delivery

ever to operate effectively and efficiently.

Many of

the reforms suggested in the commission report are worthy of careful consideration

and

likely to lead to

more humane

service. Certainly the general thrust of the report,

and more efficiently served in
community, is one that should be embraced as a matter of public policy, but in
any event will soon have to be adopted as a matter of law. 26 Nonetheless, despite its
considerable merits, the commission report's approach to actually providing community residential options can best be described as "do more of the same." As noted
above, such an approach, if not doomed to failure, is at least so cumbersome that it
is probably politically impossible to sustain the will to accomplish it. More important, it would merely perpetuate, although relocate, the segregation and disempowerment of the mentally disabled. Hence, at a time when Massachusetts is finally
taking a hard look at its mental health system, it is critical that it start down the
road toward a delivery model that will actually work.
The cornerstone of a functional community mental health system must be stable
that citizens with mental disabilities are both better
their

is not conditioned on a person's willingness to participate in treatment.
Only in this way can
overcome its addiction to the medical model that has
been such a dismal failure at realizing community care. The separation of housing
from treatment will foster the very independence that
purports to desire, as it
will for the first time allow services to be consumer driven. When not faced with the
Hobson's choice of accepting all offered services in order to be housed or rejecting
those services and facing homelessness, people will clearly indicate which services
they find helpful by utilizing those which are and rejecting those which are not.
This is not to say that persuasion should be forsaken as an option, or that people
should not be made aware of the possible adverse consequences of any given course
of conduct. However, it will force such persuasion to be just that, and not coercion.
Such an approach, in turn, will offer
planners useful guidance in future pro-

housing that

DMH

DMH

DMH
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gram development and

offer private not-for-profit providers a market incentive to
be responsive to the perceived needs and preferences of their consumers. In short,
citizens with mental disabilities will actually have a meaningful voice in meeting
their needs.

be the foundation of the community mental health system, how is it
to this question must take into consideration the problems
that the mentally disabled have traditionally experienced in gaining access to housing.
has realized since at least 1985 that part of the cause of homelessness among
those with mental disabilities is that such people regularly lose out when competing
If

housing

is

best provided?

to

The answer

DMH

with other groups for any scarce resource, especially housing. 27 Therefore, any housing
assistance provided in conjunction with a true community mental health system must
be targeted and reserved exclusively for the mentally disabled. 28 Further, it must be

designed to afford the target population the greatest choice possible,
redress the past and present proclivity of society (and

mental health problems. Next,

it

must be reasonably

plentiful, so that

nate the dual shameful practices of unnecessarily detaining those

and discharging vulnerable people

inpatient care

crowded and
is

devitalizing shelters. Finally, but of

to address the issue of homelessness

among

in

order to

DMH) to segregate those with

DMH can elimi-

who do

not require

directly to the streets or to over-

paramount importance

if

the system

the mentally handicapped, the housing

must be affordable. Market-rate apartments in Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency developments are no answer for this population.
Fortunately, an option exists that would meet all the above criteria. Rather than

DMH should

attempting to "develop" either residential milieus or even housing,

immediately implement a housing subsidy program funded,

if

necessary, entirely with

The program would operate much like the federal SecHousing program, which requires a person to pay no more than 30 percent of his or her income toward a predetermined fair market rent (FMR) for existing
private housing in the community, and then pays the landlord the difference between
the tenant's share and the FMR. The program would be available only to those eligible to receive services from
who lack an appropriate, affordable place to call
home. If financially necessary, it could be further limited to DMH's priority population, those with a serious or long-term mental impairment. Thus, a finite population
29
eligible for such a housing benefit would not be competing with the general populacurrent mental health dollars.
tion 8 Existing

DMH

tion to acquire

it.

Included in the eligible population, whether defined broadly or narrowly, would
always be those

who have been admitted

as inpatients at a

DMH

facility.

This, in

conjunction with the housing search and other ISP services discussed below, should
lists for placement and the discharge of
homeless people to the streets or shelters. Few have claimed that there is a shortage
of housing in this country, only that there is a critical shortage of affordable housing.

completely eliminate both the long waiting

By operating

its

own

subsidy program,

DMH would gain for

to the existing private housing market, which, especially
soft, is

teed.

its

when

clients

ready access

the rental market

is

only too eager to rent to those whose rent payments are government guaran-

Because the subsidies would be mobile and

the program would also accomplish

travel with the mentally disabled,

community integration

to the

maximum

extent

possible while achieving the generally accepted programmatic benefit of having
service dollars follow the beneficiary, not the provider.
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must not be tied to the acceptance of treatment or services of
would be available to any
(priority) client who lacked a
suitable place to live. While clients might reasonably be required to listen to what
other services existed, they would be entirely free to reject them all and accept only
Finally, the subsidy

any kind. Rather,

DMH

it

the housing subsidy.

Among the services available must be knowledgeable and flexible assistance in
searching for habitable housing. While such a service would assist people to find hous-

would not decide which housing a person would choose or with whom, if anylive. It would be fine for two or more people to choose to live
together, but such a living arrangement would never be forced on anyone. The Massachusetts experience with housing search workers employed by the Department of
ing,

it

body, the person should

Public Welfare

(DPW)

to help homeless families locate qualifying apartments

instructive regarding the value of this kind of assistance, as

is

the

method

is

quite

utilized

within the Homelessness Unit of Greater Boston Legal Services (GBLS). Before the
recent softening of the housing market, only about 50 percent of the unassisted families

with Section 8 certificates were successful in renting an apartment before their cer-

tificates expired.

30

In contrast, over 90 percent of the families

workers assigned by

who had housing search

DPW were able to rent within the same time frame. This discrep-

ancy in results reflects the irrational and labyrinthine nature of the country's affordable housing system and demonstrates graphically that

almost anyone to negotiate

it

it

takes professional help for

successfully.

While citizens with mental disabilities, taken as a group, may be more difficult to
house than poor families, 31 1, in my job assignment to break down the legal barriers
facing homeless mentally disabled people, have so far failed to house only one of the
clients who have sought assistance from GBLS in the past two years. Once GBLS is
successful in acquiring a housing subsidy for a client, it assigns a student intern from
the Boston University School of Social Work to work with that person to locate a
qualifying apartment owned by a landlord willing to participate in the program. Like
interns in a law office, the students can offer their opinions to clients, but ultimately
it is

is

make a "bad" decision, that
made very few such decisions (at least in

the clients' wishes that control. If a client chooses to

his or her right. In fact,

our clients have

my opinion) and have proved to be

every bit as diligent and creative in their housing

search as one might expect from a person afforded the possibility of access to a
decent, affordable

home

for perhaps the first time in his or her

life.

Nonetheless, the social work students play a valuable role in the process.

First,

they

provide a nonjudgmental companion with whom the homeless disabled person can

may be experiencing in the search process. They also prowhen the client interviews for a particular apartment,
thus overcoming or easing the unfounded fears that a landlord may have about dealing
share any anxieties that he

vide a "professional" presence

with a mentally disabled person. Finally, the students are willing "to do what

it

takes"

32

So far, this category has included such endeavors as helpand move furniture on a Saturday, purchasing two telephones (one
was stolen on the client's last night in a singles shelter) so that he would not feel isolated
in the new apartment, and arranging to have a broken television repaired to provide a
client with entertainment and company. This is exactly the sort of hands-on approach
to ensure a successful result.

ing a client acquire

DMH

is sometimes necessary and that
must be willing to provide.
Again, the mechanism exists to do the sort of housing search to ensure that the
although
employs large numbers
proposed
subsidy system will work.

that

DMH

DMH
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—

never enough

— of case managers, who are supposed

smooth return

to the

to help plan an inpatient's

community. While case management

is

another

DMH service that

must and can be revived to serve citizens
in the community. A good start in this direction would be to employ ex-patients as case
managers and assistants to case managers. They would bring a wealth of experience
and understanding to the job and, predictably, be more willing "to do what it takes,"
nonjudgmentally, to help a person avoid what is often the horror of institutionalization. As one New York consumer case manager ironically explained, his employment
has allowed him to look back on his twenty years of institutionalization not simply as a
maddening waste of his life, but also as on-the-job training for his new endeavors. 33
Employing ex-patients for this purpose can only benefit everyone involved.
Whatever the source or background of case managers, there must be many more
of them and they must be trained, at a minimum, to do housing search and public
benefits applications for people who desire those services. It is a veritable crime that
facilities withso many obviously disabled homeless individuals pass through
out anybody's assisting them to acquire the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and
Social Security Disability (SSDI) benefits to which they are almost certainly entitled.
Locating homeless individuals and getting them to apply for assistance are two of
the major hurdles in maximizing their income. In addition, an application for either
SSI or SSDI requires substantial medical documentation.
is holding such a person in a hospital, it makes
Thus, it is absurd that when
no effort to see that the person receives these federal benefits. Instead, homeless
people are disgorged as they enter, often with either no income at all or the lesser,
but entirely state paid, stipend available from General Relief. Therefore both the
individual and the state are worse off financially because of DMH's current practices. Case managers and other
employees who learn nothing but housing
search and income maximization will have gone a long way toward increasing the
stability of life in the community for many citizens with mental disabilities.
Once
has, as part of its mission and raison d'etre, provided affordable
housing, facilitated access to public benefit programs, and offered employment to
those who need and desire such assistance, it can begin to offer other, treatmentoriented services to assist clients to maintain and enjoy their place in the community. As previously noted, these services, by becoming consumer driven, will be more
likely to exhibit the flexibility necessary to accommodate the individual needs and
preferences of the people they are designed to serve.
What then is wrong with this seemingly wonderful system? The answer, in short, is
nothing. The two concerns most often raised by those wed to the medical model of
control and compliance are that the system is viable only for the less impaired and
that it would be too expensive to implement. Neither claim is supported by the available data or by experience in other states that closely resemble Massachusetts in size
and nature.
has suffered at the altar of hospital worship,

it

DMH

DMH

DMH

DMH

In 1989, the Center for

Community Change through Housing and Support con-

ducted a national survey of 378 supported housing programs. 34

It

evaluated programs

using criteria that included basing housing on people's choices, using integrated regular housing,

providing flexible supports, not imposing program requirements, and

maintaining housing during periods of

crisis

or hospitalization. In other words,

sought and found programs operated pursuant to the approaches described in
article.

The survey discovered

it

this

that individuals served in supported housing settings
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tended to be more, not

less,

disabled than those served in

programs. Because the system

is

premised on

more

stable, varied

traditional residential

housing options but-

tressed by flexible service supports, the severity of the handicap that can be accom-

modated is limited only by the creativity of those providing support.
Nor would a model premised on the provision of a housing subsidy to each
client who lacked a home cost any more than the current system. Indeed, it could
operate much more effectively than the present system for less money than is now
being spent. 35 A single person can be subsidized in his or her own apartment in
Massachusetts for no more than $5,000 per year, or just over $400 per month. 36 This
is an incredible bargain when one considers that the cost, largely underwritten by
state and municipal governments, of maintaining a person in a singles shelter is
more than $30 per night, or almost $1,000 per month. For the cost of inappropri-

DMH

ately sheltering

each mentally disabled person,

with absolutely no services,

more

DMH could affordably and, even

appropriately house two of them.

DMH and the city of Boston statistics indicate that, statewide, somewhere between
500 and 2,500 people who are "on the street" might need and qualify for the subsidy

proposed here. Even using a worst-case scenario, each of those people could be housed
for a total annual cost of no more than $12 million. If one then factored in the 500
people being detained solely because
lacks a more appropriate place for them,
the total annual cost of housing
lion.

As we have

seen,

all

DMH
DMH clients who needed

those

DMH acknowledges that

it is

it

would be $15

mil-

currently spending three times that

amount annually just to detain inappropriately the latter group of 500 people.
The short-term savings are compelling, as is the flexibility such a system affords.
Since a subsidy is simply money, it entails no development time. So
could
accommodate fluctuations in demand for the most difficult component of community

DMH

care, space, without either lengthy delays in times of increased

buildings

when demand wanes.

demand

or vacant

Further, but of critical importance, the existing

would be dispersed throughout the community, thereby avoiding
more concentrated housing arrangements and best
serving the national goal of maximum integration. Necessary and desired services and
supports would then be supplied where the client lived, rather than the client being
made to live where those services are available, but not necessarily desired. The
system would benefit the disabled and other community members alike. Even those
clients who continued to require long-term inpatient care would benefit by
hospitals of a more manageable size with a staff better able to pay attention to

private housing

the siting problems incurred by

DMH

each individual's needs.

DMH

However, a
subsidy program would most dramatically benefit the "homementally
ill."
medical model looks at this group and sees mentally disabled
The
Jess
people who happen to be homeless. Starting from this perspective it attempts to
"cure," or at least control, the illness, and refuses to or has no professional interest in
housing those for whom treatment proves unavailing. A true community model of
care based on affordable housing would view the same group as homeless people who
happen to have a mental disability. Even, or perhaps especially, if their homelessness
37
is caused by or related to their mental disabilities,
it makes absolutely no sense,

—

—

because the
homelessness
symptom
physical
disability
approach
with
regard
to
a
be corrected. A
would have doctors refusing to prescribe painkillers for a person with a chronically
bad back because they could not, or the patient would not let them, diagnose or cure
either medically or socially, to ignore the
infirmity cannot

similar
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Each of these approaches

the cause of the pain.
is

is

equally absurd, but only the former

practiced.

DMH should provide a subsidy to each of

its

avoid homelessness, whether or not the person
vices that the agency

and

may have

New York, which

is

to offer. This

getting rave reviews

responsible for administering the programs.

is

clients
is

who

requires one in order to

interested in any of the other ser-

exactly the approach, taken in

Ohio

from the mental health professionals

38

Indeed, exhibiting a rationality rarely

demonstrated by a bureaucracy, New York has included such assistance as a furniture grant and an emergency needs fund to ensure that those it discharges from its
inpatient facilities do not end up both mentally disabled and homeless. The essential
point is that even if the former condition is considered a given, the latter need not be.

Equipped with the proper perspective, a targeted subsidy program and flexible
could end homelessness among the mentally disabled population of
the commonwealth almost immediately. Further, it could do so without spending
any more, and perhaps less, money than it now does. At a time when its delivery
system is being reexamined anyhow,
should jettison its reliance on a medical
model that has arguably contributed to, but unarguably failed to address, the problem of homelessness among those with mental disabilities. By adopting a subsidy
supports,

DMH

DMH

system just for

its clients,

with services developed to address their expressed needs,

DMH would provide better care, integrate and empower the disabled as the law will
soon require, and perhaps most important, end homelessness among that portion of
the commonwealth's population for which the Department of Mental Health is

Z+

legally responsible.

Notes
1.

it is generally assumed that approximately one percent of the
from some form of serious or long-term mental illness. The best
available data concerning the single homeless suggests that roughly 30 percent of that population has serious mental health problems. See note 4 and accompanying text.

For health planning purposes

overall population suffers

2.

See

Virginia Mulkern,

Homelessness Needs Assessment Study: Findings and Recommendations
Hereafter cited as Homelessness

Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (1985),
Needs Assessment.
for the

3.

ii.

Boston Emergency Shelter Commission, Commitment and Compassion (Winter 1990-1991):
p. 10.

4.

See Mulkern, Homelessness Needs Assessment, and Access, a publication of the National
Resource Center on Homelessness and Mental Illness, 3, citing studies by Roth et al. in Ohio
(1985) and Struening in New York (1986).

5.

Actions for Quality Care, Report of the Governor's Special Commission on Consolidation of
Health and

Human

Hereafter cited as
6.

Services Institutional

Facilities,

Executive Summary, June 1991,

8.

Commission Report.

Between 1980 and 1988, the federal budget authority for needed low-income housing
dropped from $27.9 billion to $9.7 billion. The Closing Door, National Coalition for the
Homeless, December 1990.
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See Sarah

8.

Commission Report,

Glazer,

The Mentally III,

in

Editorial

Research Reports, February
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9.

DMH Comprehensive Mental Health Service Plan,

Edition 4.0,

May

1991, 117. Hereafter cited

as Comprehensive Plan.
1

0.

1 1.

Commission Report,

3.

While, pursuant to M.G.L.
(section 10)
facilities

c.

123 (1988), Massachusetts,

and involuntary (sections

7, 8, 11,

and

in

theory has both voluntary

12) inpatients,

not to accept voluntary patients. Thus, a person

is

it

is

the practice of

DMH

either brought to a facility against

his or her will and admitted and retained pursuant to sections 7, 8, and 12, or voluntarily seeks
treatment and is admitted pursuant to section 1 1 on a "conditional voluntary" basis. Under
section 1 1, a person who is unsatisfied with the care is not free to leave, but rather must give
,

the

facility

may

three days' written notice of the intention to leave. During this period, the

facility

have the person committed pursuant to sections 7 and 8. Since the
court hearing need not be, and most often is not, scheduled for fourteen days after the DMH
request, a person who enters a facility "voluntarily" can be forced to remain for up to seventeen days against his or her will without an opportunity for impartial review.
1

2.

petition a court to

Commission Report,

3.

arrangement has resulted in a total of fewer than 140 apartments being occuDMH and DMR. Fewer than 25 of those apartments are subsidized, which,
given the substantial market rents charged by MHFA developments, means that the vast
majority of independent-living situations being provided by DMH are going to its wealthier
clients. MHFA market-rent apartments are not a financially viable option for the homeless,
even if they could get accepted for occupancy at such developments. See note 22.

13. Ibid., 33. This

pied by clients of

14.

Comprehensive

Plan, 119.

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17.

As

a further reflection of the fact that

sense,

DMH, and

unfortunately

some

such programs are not

really

housing

in

any meaningful

courts, take the position that people living in

dential settings are not entitled to the protection of

DMH

resi-

Massachusetts landlord-tenant law before

they can be removed from a program.
18.

Only one of DMH's

has been able
Commission Report, 5, 6.

fifteen adult inpatient facilities

minimum standards for

accreditation.

to

meet the HCFA/JCAHO

19.

must be stressed that these placements will serve only current inpatients. The approximately 4,000 community placements that will exist after adding these 700 new ones will meet
only one third of DMH's perceived overall need. Commission Report, 28.

20.

The cost

It

of

community placements ranges between $30,000 and $70,000 per person per

year,

with an average cost of $55,000. Commission Report, 29.
21

Comprehensive

22.

Even DMH's major effort to arrange truly independent, albeit expensive, living situations, that
is, the agreement with MHFA for access to 3 percent of its units built since 1979, is not as
expeditious as it may appear to be. The final decision regarding whether to accept a person as
a tenant rests with the management of the MHFA development, not with DMH. While DMH
often attempts to facilitate acceptance, MHFA developments are, in my experience and that of
others who attempt to house the homeless, among the most demanding and least flexible in
their tenant selection practices. This fact has two negative effects. First, it induces DMH to
seek to house only its "most worthy" (read compliant) clients. Second, the extensive verifications required by the developments again slow down the process of housing those who need

Plan, 114-15.

a place to stay.
23. Pursuant to 104 C.M.R. section 16.03(2)(c),

M.G.L.

c.

anyone admitted

to a

123, sections 10, 11, or 12 "shall be eligible for ... an

cess are set forth at 104 C.M.R. section16.01(2).
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inpatient facility

ISR"The goals

under

of the ISP pro-

Forsberg et ano., Civ. No. 91-3835E (Superior Ct., Suffolk Co.), and J.S. and
Civ. No. 90-7275F (Superior Ct., Suffolk Co.). In the Williams case, the plaintiffs claim that DMH's discharge practices constitute the ongoing common law tort of negligent discharge, and that, based on that and several other statutory and constitutional theories,
DMH should be ordered to provide the type of subsidy program suggested later in this article.

24. Williams et

DM.

25.

al. v.

Weld eta/..

v.

Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), RL. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, July 26, 1990.
Section 2(a)(8) of the Act provides that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with

Americans with

full participation, independent living, and
such individuals." People with mental disabilities are specifically
the coverage of the act by section 3(2)(A).

disabilities are to

economic
included
26.

assure equality of opportunity,

self-sufficiency for

in

ADA sections that govern

the provision of government services, including mental health
on January 27, 1992. The legislative history of the act makes it clear that
Congress intends services to be provided in the most integrated setting possible, even if

The

services, took effect

doing so
485(lll),

is

either logistically or financially less convenient for the provider. H.R. Rep. No.

101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990).

27 Homelessness Needs Assessment, Executive Summary, 130.
'.

28. While the

housing assistance provided by

DMH

must be reserved exclusively

for the mentally

disabled, the actual housing acquired with that assistance should to the greatest extent possi-

be

ble

29. Since

normal, integrated settings open to

in

DMH and

its

to assist the general
felt

members

of the general public.

doctors believe themselves capable of defining and recognizing mental

ness, a major problem

has

all

in

operating a general housing program

is

thereby overcome.

homeless population through various housing

initiatives,

In

ill-

seeking

Massachusetts

constrained to develop elaborate and often bizarre definitions of the "worthy" home-

from what it believes would otherwise be an epidemic of voluntarinduced homelessness endured solely to gain access to affordable housing. It is highly
unlikely that, even for the substantial benefit of affordable housing, someone would voluntarily
seek the stigma still associated with mental illness. Even a person who might do so would presumably not be able to fool a DMH doctor. Hence, quality control should not be a significant
problem in the proposed program. See note 19 for DMH's estimate of the maximum number
less in order to protect itself
ily

of people

who

might qualify for such a program.

program, a certificate is valid for no more than four months. If a person is
unable to find a qualifying apartment within that period, the person's right to a subsidy expires
and the certificate is given to the next person on the waiting list. There would be no purpose
for such a time limit in the program run by DMH. Unlike the Section 8 program, the number of
eligible people is relatively small and a subsidy would be offered to everyone who needed

30. In the Section 8

one. Thus, there would be no need to pass the subsidy along
apartment within a fixed period of time.
31. While the barriers to

housing the mentally disabled are

all

if it

were not converted

into

an

too well known, the routes around
most people, including

or through those barriers are a relatively well-kept secret. For example,

many DMH case managers and
ize

a significant

number

of local housing authorities,

developments or categorically

eligible for

almost

all

federal subsidies.

Nor

nized that the superficially neutral determination of whether an applicant

pendent

living"

is in

fact

an

illegal

and therefore impermissible inquiry

extent of a person's disability. While the

abled

is

field,

they

will

become

list

is

it widely recog"capable of inde-

is

into the nature

and

of legal solutions to acquiring housing for the dis-

is that housing search workers can be
and respond to them. Once they have mastered the

familiar with housing opportunities for the disabled that are not neces-

sarily available to other

members

of the general public.

To borrow a phrase from the Vermont Center
Support, a pioneering organization

33.

real-

too lengthy to be catalogued here, the point

trained to recognize illegal procedures

32.

do not

or acknowledge that mentally disabled persons are eligible for so-called elderly housing

in

for

Community Change through Housing and

the sorts of solutions suggested

Statement of Dick Gelman, Bronx, New York, May 29, 1991,
Learning Community Conference in Washington, D.C.
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in this article.

at the Ninth National

CSP
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34.

See

a newsletter of the center, In

Community,

1,

no.

1,

(June 1991):

6.

how much the proposed model would cost in the long run is largely an unknown,
because the calculus depends on many policy decisions that would be made along the way
concerning the nature and quality of supports. The center study discussed in the text found
that as the severity of the impairments being accommodated increased, so did the cost of providing such accommodation. This model could be made to cost as much as the one now used
by DMH, but it would provide more complete and effective services. The center therefore suggests that the supported model may not always be less expensive, but it will never be more
expensive for any given level of care. In all cases, moreover, because of the underlying human
assumptions of the model, it will provide better care for each dollar expended.

35. Exactly

36.

The median FMR for a studio apartment in Massachusetts is $465, while that for a one bedroom is $561. Representing DMH's maximum liability per person, this would almost always be
reduced by one or both of the following factors. First, the tenant would contribute 30 percent
of his or her income toward the cost of the apartment. If the person were receiving, for example,

SSI at the current rate of $520 per month, the tenant share of approximately $160 per

to DMH, even based on the full median FMR, to $400 per
month. However, especially in a soft market, apartments are almost always available for
less than the FMR in any particular area. While the 1990 one-bedroom FMR for Medford, a
city within five miles of Boston, was $739, the actual average rent of all the Section 8 onebedroom apartments administered by the Medford Housing Authority that year was just
under $510 per month. When the predictable tenant share is deducted from this figure, the
cost to DMH is even less than that cited in the text.

month would reduce the cost

37.

1991 newspaper articles and so-called think pieces, it is becoming increasblame the homeless for their condition. Presumably this phenomenon reflects
the traditionally short attention span and low frustration threshold of the American public,
which, after unsuccessfully throwing very little money and even less thought at a problem, is
more than willing to blame a victim for his or her own fate. The in-vogue argument along
these lines points to the mentally disabled homeless and suggests that those who think the
problem is housing "just don't get it." In fact, the problem is housing, or at least affordable
housing, which is an enormously scarce resource. While a person's mental disability may
help explain why she in particular is homeless if she has been asked to compete in the open
market for that resource, it is no indication that she cannot live in a community if reasonable
accommodation is made for his or her handicap. A subsidized housing program exclusively
for those with mental disabilities is just such an accommodation.

Judging from

late

ingly popular to

38.

Statements of Grace Lewis, state housing coordinator, Ohio DMH, and Robert Myers, director
of local operations and community capital, New York Office of Mental Health, delivered May
30, 1991, at the Ninth National CSP Learning Community Conference in Washington, D.C.
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